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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John R. Walk *
Michael R. Spitzer, II **

I. INTRODUCTION

This article will summarize recent developments of interest to
practitioners handling civil cases in the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Specifically included are relevant decisions of
the Supreme Court of Virginia dating from opinions announced
on June 10, 2004 to those announced on April 22, 2005; changes
to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia announced during
the same time period; and legislation enacted by the Virginia
General Assembly at its 2005 Session, effective July 1, 2005.
II. MISTRIAL

In Lowe v. Cunningham,' the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether improper questioning by counsel had been cured
by a cautionary instruction to the jury.2 That case involved a personal injury claim arising out of an automobile accident.3 On
cross-examination, plaintiff was questioned about where he was
living at the time of the accident.4 Defense counsel then asked:
"And you continued to live with her until you got into a little

* Shareholder, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1977, College of
William and Mary; J.D., 1980, University of Richmond School of Law. He is an Adjunct
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
** Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 2001, College of
William and Mary; J.D., 2004, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. 268 Va. 268, 601 S.E.2d 628 (2004).
2. Id. at 271, 601 S.E.2d at 630.
3. Id. at 270, 601 S.E.2d at 629.
4. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:95

trouble with the law about not paying child support?"5 This question was objected to immediately and the trial court sustained the
objection.6 Although defendant did not respond, in fact, he had
been jailed for ninety days for failure to pay child support.7 Plaintiff moved for a mistrial which was denied by the trial judge.8 Instead, the jury was instructed to disregard the question.9 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff but in the amount of only
$575.10
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial
judge had abused his discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial. 1
The court recognized that this was a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and, further, "that a jury is presumed to
have followed a timely and explicit cautionary instruction directing it to disregard an improper remark or question by counsel." 2
Nonetheless, the court held:
The trial court's determination whether a statement or question of
counsel is so inherently prejudicial that the prejudice cannot be
cured by a cautionary instruction must be guided by a consideration
of several factors. These factors include the relevance and content of
the improper reference, and whether the reference was deliberate or
inadvertent in nature. The court also must consider the probable effect of the improper reference by counsel. All these factors must be
considered because not every irrelevant statement or question will
13
result in prejudice to an opposing party.

It was acknowledged that plaintiff was not called upon to answer the question and that defense counsel did not persist in the
line of questioning after the trial judge sustained the objection. 4
Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, however, the court was
persuaded that the question was a deliberate attempt to unfairly

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 271, 601 S.E.2d at 629.
Id., 601 S.E.2d at 629-30.
Id.
Id.
See id., 601 S.E.2d at 630.
Id.
Id. at 274, 601 S.E.2d at 631-32.
Id. at 272, 601 S.E.2d at 630.
Id. at 273, 601 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 274, 601 S.E.2d at 631.
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prejudice the jury against the plaintiff and held that the cautionary instruction could not remove the resulting prejudice. 5
Justices Agee, Lacy, and Kinser dissented from the decision,
primarily pointing to the presumption and mitigating factors discussed above.' 6 Interestingly, although the issue presented was
remarkably similar to that involved in Velocity Express MidAtlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 7 decided a year ago, neither the majority
nor the dissenting opinion discussed the case. In Velocity Express
Mid-Atlantic, the prejudice resulted more from repetition than intent.'" The plaintiffs attorney had repeatedly invoked the
"Golden Rule" in argument. 9 Although admonished by the trial
judge, the Supreme Court of Virginia held the resulting prejudice
to the defendant to be incurable.2"

III. RES JUDICATA
The case of American Safety Casualty Insurance Co. v. C.G.
Mitchell Construction, Inc.2" involved the application of res judicata as between principal and surety.2 2 American Safety had
written a payment bond for the general contractor on a construction project.2 3 Mitchell, a subcontractor, sued on the bond naming
both the general contractor and American Safety.24 During the
pendency of the suit, the general contractor's counsel withdrew
from the case, its officers and registered agent resigned, and the
State Corporation Commission terminated the corporation."
When the corporation subsequently failed to produce a designee
pursuant to plaintiffs Rule 4:5(b)(6) deposition notice, the trial
court granted default judgment as a discovery sanction.2 6 Ameri-

15.
16.

Id.
See id. at 276, 601 S.E.2d at 632 (Agee, J., dissenting).

17. 266 Va. 188, 585 S.E.2d 557 (2003). For additional discussion of Velocity Express
Mid-Atlantic, see John R. Walk, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and Procedure, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 87, 108-10 (2004).
18. 266 Va. at 202-03, 585 S.E.2d at 565.
19. Id. at 203, 585 S.E.2d at 565.
20. Id. at 202, 585 S.E.2d at 565.

21.

268 Va. 340, 601 S.E.2d 633 (2004).

22.
23.
24.

See id. at 343, 601 S.E.2d at 634.
Id. at 343-44, 601 S.E.2d at 634-35.
Id. at 345, 601 S.E.2d at 635-36.

25.

Id., 601 S.E.2d at 636.

26.

Id. at 346, 601 S.E.2d at 636.
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can Safety had knowledge of all of the foregoing and argued that
no corporate deposition was necessary because plaintiff could
subpoena the former officers personally." Following entry of default judgment against the general contractor, the plaintiff moved
for summary judgment against American Safety.2 8 The trial court
held that its prior judgment against the principal was binding on
the surety.2 9
On appeal this decision was affirmed.3" Quoting from a federal
case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, Drill South, Inc. v. InternationalFidelity Insurance Co.,"
the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned: "'the general rule that
has emerged is that a surety is bound by any judgment against
its principal, default or otherwise, when the surety had full
knowledge of the action against the principal and an opportunity
to defend."'3 2 The court rejected American Safety's argument that
the plaintiff could have deposed the former officers personally,
holding that this would not have the same effect as deposing the
corporation pursuant to Rule 4:5(b)(6).33 It also affirmed the trial
court's decision to grant default judgment as a reasonable discovery sanction under the circumstances presented.3 4
IV. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of judicial estoppel or "estoppel by inconsistent
position" was the subject of Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.35 That case involved access to a parcel acquired
by Lofton Ridge via a disputed access road across Norfolk Southern's property.36 Lofton Ridge initially brought an action against
Norfolk Southern seeking an injunction from interfering with the
purported access road.37 While this case was pending, Lofton

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 347, 601 S.E.2d at 636.
Id. at 353, 601 S.E.2d at 640-41.
234 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2000).
268 Va. at 350, 601 S.E.2d at 638-39 (quoting Drill South, Inc., 234 F.3d at 1235).
Id. at 352, 601 S.E.2d at 640.
Id. at 352-53, 601 S.E.2d at 640.
268 Va. 377, 380, 601 S.E.2d 648, 650 (2004).
Id. at 379, 601 S.E.2d at 649.
Id. at 379-80, 601 S.E.2d at 649.
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Ridge sued the attorneys and surveyor involved in closing the
purchase of the land alleging constructive fraud and professional
negligence.3" This case was dismissed with prejudice following
successful mediation.3 9 Norfolk Southern then filed a plea in bar
to the present action asserting judicial estoppel.4"
Citing a number of prior Virginia cases, the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated that "[e]ssentially, judicial estoppel forbids parties
from 'assum[ing] successive positions in the course of a suit, or
series of suits, in reference to the same fact or state of facts,
which are inconsistent with each other, or mutually contradictory.'"41 The court undertook to compare and contrast judicial estoppel from res judicata and collateral estoppel." Among other
things, the court noted that judicial estoppel does not require a
prior final judgment.4 3 It can be invoked within a single action
based upon prior positions taken in that action.4 4 It may also operate as a bar to maintaining a new cause of action. 45 However,
"'[t]he doctrine of estoppel by inconsistent position [i.e., judicial
estoppel] does not apply to a prior proceeding in which the parties
are not the same.' 4' The court discussed a prior decision, Canada
v. C.H. Beasley & Bros.,47 in which it appeared to have invoked
judicial estoppel without literal mutuality of parties.4" The court
characterized this portion of the opinion as dicta and stated that
to the extent Canada suggested judicial estoppel could be employed without mutuality of parties, it was overruled. 9

38. Id. at 380, 601 S.E.2d at 649.
39. Id.
40. Id., 601 S.E.2d at 650.
41. Id. at 380-81, 601 S.E.2d at 650 (alteration in original) (quoting Burch v. Grace
Street Bldg. Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 S.E. 672, 677 (1937)).
42. Id. at 381-82, 601 S.E.2d at 650-51.
43. Id. at 381, 601 S.E.2d at 650.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 382, 601 S.E.2d at 651. This holding is particularly significant in view of the
Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., applying a strict
"cause of action" test for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata. 265 Va. 159, 165, 576
S.E.2d 504, 506 (2003).
46. Lofton Ridge, 268 Va. at 382, 601 S.E.2d at 651 (quoting Pittston Co. v. O'Hara,
191 Va. 886, 902, 126 S.E. 34, 43 (1951)). The Supreme Court of Virginia did recognize an
exception where the liability of one party is derivative of another. Id.
47. 132 Va. 166, 111 S.E. 251 (1922).
48. 268 Va. at 383, 601 S.E.2d at 651.
49. Id.
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In Friday-Spivey v. Collier,"° the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a driver of a fire truck responding to a non-emergency
call was not entitled to sovereign immunity.5 1 The fire truck collided with plaintiff's vehicle while responding to a report of an infant locked in a vehicle.5 2 It was acknowledged that this was a
"Priority 2" call during which the driver did not have the emergency lights or siren activated and was required to obey all traffic
regulations. 3 The court applied the four-prong test 4 of James v.
Jane:5 (1) the function performed by the employee, (2) "the extent
of the state's interest and involvement in that function," (3) the
degree of control and direction the state exercises over the employee, and (4) "[w]hether the act performed involves the use of
judgment and discretion."56 The parties agreed that the first three
prongs were met in this case and that the sole issue was the "exercise of judgment and discretion" prong. 7
The driver pointed to the size and weight of the fire truck and
the necessity of specialized training in its operation as indicia of
the exercise of judgment and discretion." The court rejected this
contention, stating that "[t]he special skill and training required
to operate a fire truck under these circumstances is not the exercise per se of judgment and discretion for purposes of sovereign
immunity."59 Importantly, the court distinguished this case from
other situations where exigent circumstances existed, citing
Colby v. Boyden,6 ° involving a high-speed police chase,6 1 and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Catlett Volunteer Fire Co.,62
involving a fire truck responding to an emergency with lights and

50. 268 Va. 384, 601 S.E.2d 591 (2004).
51. Id. at 386, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 386-87, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
Id. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
Id. at 387-88, 601 S.E.2d at 593.
221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).

56.

Id. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 388, 601 S.E.2d at 593.
Id. at 388-89, 601 S.E.2d at 593.
Id. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 594.
241 Va. 125, 400 S.E.2d 184 (1991).
Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
241 Va. 402, 404 S.E.2d 216 (1991).
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siren activated.63 The court concluded that given the nonemergency nature of the call in the instant case, it was a "ministerial act requiring no significant judgment and discretion beyond
that of ordinary driving in routine traffic."64
Justices Kinser and Koontz dissented from the decision, stating
that "driving a 40,000-pound fire truck to a shopping mall in response to a dispatch involving an infant locked in a vehicle required the exercise of judgment and discretion in order to effectuate the governmental purpose of providing rescue services. "
These Justices pointed to the fact that the situation certainly entailed the possibility of danger to the infant and the driver had no
way of knowing whether or not such danger was present until he
arrived.66 In this regard, the case was like Colby and National
Railroadcited in the majority opinion.67
The issue of sovereign immunity was also the subject of City of
Chesapeake v. Cunningham.6" Cunningham filed a lawsuit
against the City of Chesapeake ("City") alleging that she sustained a miscarriage as a result of toxic water supplied by the
City. 69 The City defended by entering a special plea of sovereign

immunity, which the trial court denied.7 °

As background for the case, the City in 1980 began using a water treatment plant to supply water to its residents.71 The source
water in the area is atypical in that the river has high levels of
organic carbon.72 When chlorine is added to the water, large
amounts of trihalomethanes ("THMs") are produced.7 3 When the
plant was designed, THMs were not regulated contaminants. 4
Beginning in 1979, the EPA set a maximum content level
("MCL") for THMs as contaminants at 100 parts per billion

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 217.
Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 391, 601 S.E.2d at 595.
Id. at 391, 601 S.E.2d at 595 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
Id. at 392, 601 S.E.2d at 596 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
Id. at 392-93, 601 S.E.2d at 596 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
268 Va. 624, 604 S.E.2d 420 (2004).
Id. at 627, 604 S.E.2d at 422.
Id.
Id. at 628-29, 604 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 628, 604 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.
Id.
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("ppb").7 The Chesapeake plant tested its water supply in 1980
and found that the water contained between 200 and 350 ppb of
THMs.7 6 Over the next five years, the City adopted various methods to reduce the level of THMs to 100 ppb and was successful at
achieving that level.77
In 1997, the City anticipated that new regulations would decrease the allowable amount of THMs to 80 ppb.78 In order to
achieve the 80 ppb goal, the plant had to be modified. 79 During
the modification period, the level of THMs would have to increase
above 100 ppb. ° The City "petitioned the State Health Commissioner.., for a temporary exemption from the water quality regulations.""' The Commissioner granted the exemption, and a notice
was published in a local newspaper."
In 1998, a study by the California Department of Health Services "found that daily consumption of more than five glasses of
water with [THMI levels greater than 75 ppb increased the risk of
spontaneous abortion for women in their first trimester of pregnancy."83 In response to the study, the City issued three separate
papers publicizing the water warnings, including actions women
should take during the water plant's transition phase.84 Television outlets provided extensive coverage of the problem, issuing
twenty-two reports in a month-long period in 1998.8' The City
also mailed warnings to all postal patrons in the City and to all
new water service subscribers.8 6 Cunningham testified at trial
8 7
that she did not receive any warnings.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reiterated the general principles of sovereign immunity. "Sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 628-29, 604 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 629, 604 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 629-30, 604 S.E.2d at 423-24.
Id. at 630, 604 S.E.2d at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631, 604 S.E.2d at 424.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 425.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 632, 604 S.E.2d at 425.
Id.
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governmental functions.""8 Government functions are defined as
"powers and duties performed exclusively for the public welfare."89 The court stated that "when a municipality plans, designs,
regulates, or provides a service for the common good, it performs
a governmental function."9 ° "In contrast, routine maintenance or
operation of a municipal service is proprietary" and is not protected by sovereign immunity.9 1
The court held that the City was exercising discretionary legislative power which is a governmental function shielded from tort
liability.9 2 The court distinguished the case from City of Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp.93 and Woods v. Town
of Marion,9 4 stating that in those cases, the torts stemmed from
purely ministerial acts of maintaining sprinkler systems and water pipes, and thus, the municipalities in those cases were not
shielded by sovereign immunity.95 Instead, the court analogized
the case to Stansbury v. City of Richmond,9 6 where the court held
that sovereign immunity protected the municipality from a claim
of inadequate water pressure while the municipality was upgrading its water system to correct the problem. Based on these
cases, the court held that the City was exercising legislative discretion for the public welfare, was not engaging in a purely ministerial act, and therefore the City was shielded from sovereign
immunity.98
VI. STANDING
Braddock, L.C. v. Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County9 9
involved the appeal of a zoning decision by the Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors.'0 0 The original zoning case involved two
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 633, 604 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 426.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 426-27.
Id. at 635, 604 S.E.2d at 427.
148 Va. 60, 138 S.E. 503 (1927).
245 Va. 44, 425 S.E.2d 487 (1993).
City of Chesapeake, 268 Va. at 636, 604 S.E.2d at 427-28.
116 Va. 205, 81 S.E. 26 (1914).
268 Va. at 636-37, 604 S.E.2d at 428.
See id. at 640, 604 S.E.2d at 430.
268 Va. 420, 601 S.E.2d 552 (2004).
Id. at 422-23, 601 S.E.2d at 552-53.
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parcels, both of which were under contract to Braddock at the
time it applied for rezoning.' ° ' Before filing suit, Braddock assigned its contract to one of the parcels to another entity. °2 Braddock closed on the acquisition of the other parcel after filing suit,
but immediately conveyed it to another entity.0 3 The board filed a
plea in bar challenging Braddock's standing to maintain the suit
since it no longer had any interest in either of the subject parcels.0 4 Braddock responded by moving to add the owners of the
two parcels as necessary parties to the suit, which the board opposed pursuant to Virginia Code section 15.2-2285(F). 10 5
Citing Friends of Clark Mountain Foundation v. Board of Supervisors of Orange County,10 6 Braddock argued that all that was
required under the statute was that a case be filed by an aggrieved person and that additional parties could be added after
the expiration of the thirty day period allowed by statute for challenging zoning decisions.0 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, distinguished Clark Mountain on the basis that the case
had been timely filed by a party with standing.' The additional
party added after expiration of the statutory period was the applicant that was added as a defendant. 10 9 The court went on to
hold that Braddock had no standing and invoked its decision in
Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia National Bank"'
barring the substitution of a party with standing for a party with
no standing."'
Justice Kinser wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Agee, which stated that Braddock did have standing to bring the
suit as to one of the two subject parcels as the contract pur-

101. Id. at 423, 601 S.E.2d at 553.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2285(F) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005)).
This code section requires that any action challenging a zoning decision be filed within
thirty days of the decision. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2285(F) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum.
Supp.2005).
106. 242 Va. 16, 406 S.E.2d 19 (1991) (making its decision under a predecessor statue,
Virginia Code section 15.1-493(G), which similarly provided a thirty-day period for challenging zoning decisions).
107. Braddock, 268 Va. at 424, 601 S.E.2d at 553-54.
108. Id. at 424 & n.1, 601 S.E.2d at 553-54 & n.1.
109. Clark Mountain, 242 Va. at 18-19, 406 S.E.2d at 20.
110. 231 Va. 440, 344 S.E.2d 913 (1986).
111. Braddock, 268 Va. at 423, 601 S.E.2d at 553.
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chaser.11 2 Although the concurring opinion does not expressly so
state, the implicit premise of the opinion is that Braddock's
standing was not affected by the subsequent conveyance of this
parcel. 11 3 The zoning decision being challenged, however, involved
two parcels and Braddock had no interest in the second parcel
when the suit was filed. 4 These Justices held that "[s]ince the
rezoning application encompassed both parcels, Braddock did not
have the requisite interest in the entire property necessary to
give it standing to challenge the Board's denial of the rezoning
application."" 5 Braddock cited a number of cases involving plaintiffs holding partial interests challenging zoning decisions. 6 The
court distinguished these cases on the basis that they involved
propparties holding less than a fee simple interest in the entire
7
application."1
rezoning
the
of
subject
the
erty that was
In one of the most significant decisions of the 2004-2005 session, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Board of Supervisors of
Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County,"'
decided that counties have standing to challenge decisions of local
boards of zoning appeals." 9 In 2002, an individual named Hickerson desired to subdivide his parcel into two parts, but one of the
proposed parcels would only have a minimum lot width of twenty
feet, in violation of the applicable zoning ordinance. 2 ° Hickerson
sought and received a variance from the Board of Zoning Appeals
("BZA") to allow the subdivision. 2' The board of supervisors of the
county then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit
court challenging the decision of the BZA.122 The circuit court held
that the board of supervisors had standing to challenge the decicourt that approved the
sion of the BZA, but it was the circuit
1 23
variance.
the
grant
to
decision
BZA's
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the main issue
was whether the county had standing to challenge a decision of a

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 427, 601 S.E.2d at 555 (Kinser, J., concurring).
See id. at 426-27, 601 S.E.2d at 555 (Kinser, J., concurring).
Id. (Kinser, J., concurring).
Id. at 427, 601 S.E.2d at 555 (Kinser, J., concurring).
Id. at 424-25 n.2, 601 S.E.2d at 554 n.2.
Id.
268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
Id. at 446, 604 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 444, 604 S.E.2d at 8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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local board of zoning appeals.'2 4 Virginia Code section 15.2-2314
states that "[any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved
by any decision of the board of zoning appeals" may file a petition
with the circuit court.' 25 The BZA argued that the county is not
aggrieved pursuant to the statute, and therefore lacks standing to
appeal. 126 The court disagreed. First, the court cited Virginia Code
section 15.2-2308, which "requires that every locality that has
enacted a zoning ordinance establish a board of zoning appeals." 27 Second, the court cited Virginia Code section 15.2-1404,
which "grants a local governing board the broad power to institute actions in its own name with regard to 'all matters connected
with its duties." 2 8 The court stated that Virginia Code section
15.2-1404 was designed to enable the local governing body to ensure compliance with legislative enactments, including zoning ordinances.29 Therefore, the court held that the county was an aggrieved person pursuant to Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 and
had standing to sue the BZA. 3 ° The court also cited opinions from
other states holding similarly, including Alabama, Nevada, Rhode
Island, and Idaho, among others.' 3 '
The court distinguished the case at bar from Virginia Beach
Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Appeals.'3 2 The
BZA contended that this case required dismissal of the board of
supervisors' appeal.'3 3 In Virginia Beach Beautification Commission, the court did not consider whether a county has standing to
challenge a decision of a board of zoning appeals.' Instead, Virginia Beach Beautification Commission only dealt with whether a
non-stock corporation that claimed a general public interest in

124. Id.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
126. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 268 Va. at 445, 604 S.E.2d at 8.
127. Id. at 446, 604 S.E.2d at 9.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 447-48, 604 S.E.2d at 9-10 (citing Ex parte City of Huntsville, 684 So. 2d
123, 126 (Ala. 1996); City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 676-77, 895 P.2d 663, 666
(1995); City of East Providence v. Shell Oil Co., 110 R.I. 138, 142, 290 A.2d 915, 917-18
(1972); City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 908, 693 P.2d 1108, 1110
(Ct. App. 1984)).
132. Id. at 449, 604 S.E.2d at 11 (distinguishing Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n
v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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the decision of a board of zoning appeals decision was an aggrieved party for standing purposes.13 5 There, the court held that
absent an immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest, a party
is not aggrieved for standing purposes.13 6 In contrast to Virginia
Beach Beautification Commission, the county in the case at bar
had an immediate and substantial interest in the litigation, and
thus had standing. 3 v
Finally, the court held that the BZA had impermissibly granted
a variance to Hickerson. 36 Citing Cochran v. Fairfax County
Board of Zoning Appeals,139 the court stated that "a board of zoning appeals has authority to grant variances only to avoid an unconstitutional result." 4 ° Only when a zoning ordinance interferes
"with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a
In the case at bar, Hickerson
whole" is a variance allowed.'
merely wanted to subdivide his property into two lots.142 Hickerson's home or beneficial use of the property were not threatened
by the zoning ordinance. 4 3 Therefore, the BZA impermissibly
granted the variance." 4
Justices Kinser and Lacy dissented, criticizing the majority's
holding that the county is an aggrieved person pursuant to Virginia Code section 15.2-2314.145 They maintained that the strong
interest of the county is no different from the interest of the public generally, and therefore, the county does not have standing to
challenge decisions of boards of zoning appeals. 4 6 The dissenters
cited Virginia Beach Beautification Commission as holding that
the term "aggrieved" means "a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public
generally."'4 7 Justices Kinser and Lacy argued that the majority

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 449-50, 604 S.E.2d at 11.
Id. at 450, 604 S.E.2d at 11.
Id. at 451-53, 604 S.E.2d at 12-13.
267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571 (2004).
Bd. of Supervisorsof FairfaxCounty, 268 Va. at 452, 604 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 454, 604 S.E.2d at 13 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kinser, J., dissenting).
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 14 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia Beautification
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did not follow the definition of aggrieved and did not demonstrate
how the decision of the BZA is the denial of some personal or
property right that is different from that suffered by the public
generally. 4 ' The dissenters also attacked the cases from other
states cited by the majority, finding that those cases involved
public aggrievement, whereas in Virginia, the test for aggrievement is a right that is private or personal and not shared by the
public.'4 9
The dissenters also criticized the majority for allowing counties
to appeal the decisions of any local boards established to enforce
ordinances in the absence of the express grant of that power from
the General Assembly. 5 ° In addition, contrary to the majority's
view that a board of zoning appeals could act arbitrarily if the
county lacked standing to appeal, the dissenters argued that private parties aggrieved by a decision of a board of zoning appeals
have standing to sue and can act as a check on arbitrary power."'
Therefore, for the above reasons, Justices Kinser and Lacy did
not find that the county met the definition of an aggrieved person
and therefore lacked standing to appeal the BZA's variance decision."'
In Shilling v. Jimenez, 15' the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of whether a landowner has standing to attack
the decision of a local governing body concerning subdivisions by
initiating suit directly against the subdividers.' Jiminez owned
a tract of land in Loudoun County that was zoned A-3, a classification that would have allowed the property to be subdivided if it
had 240 feet of frontage on Route 275.' The property did not
156
have the requisite road frontage.
Pursuant to enabling legislation by the General Assembly, Virginia Code section 15.2-2244, Loudoun County permitted family

Comm'n, 231 Va. at 419-20, 344 S.E.2d at 902-03).
148. Id. at 455, 604 S.E.2d at 14 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 455-57, 604 S.E.2d at 14-15 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 457-58, 604 S.E.2d at 15-16 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 458, 604 S.E.2d at 16 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 459, 604 S.E.2d at 16 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
153. 268 Va. 202, 597 S.E.2d 206 (2004).
154. Id. at 204, 597 S.E.2d at 207.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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subdivisions on private access easement roads.15 7 Family subdivisions allowed a lot to be subdivided and conveyed to family members."'8 The ordinance provided that such a subdivision could not
be entered into for purposes of circumventing the general regulations concerning subdivisions. 59 The ordinance provided that "[i]f
a family subdivision grantee should convey such a lot within one
year after the date of approval of the subdivision," a presumption
of intent to circumvent the ordinance would arise and authorized
the Director of the Department of Building and Development to
"'take any reasonable actions necessary to ameliorate the 60effect of
such circumvention,"' including vacating the subdivision.
Jiminez applied for a family subdivision to divide her parcel
into three lots and conveyed two of the lots to her mother and sister and kept the remaining lot for herself.161 Jiminez, her mother,
and her sister submitted affidavits to the Loudoun County Board
of Supervisors that the purpose of the subdivision was to keep the
estate within the family. 162 The board of supervisors approved the

subdivision. 163
Less than a year after the subdivision was approved, the family
conveyed two of the plats to a corporation." Within a few months,
Shilling, whose property neighbored the Jiminez estate, filed a
bill of complaint against Jiminez and her family, the purchaser of
the property, and a bank holding a deed of trust on the land,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the family subdivision was
void and a decree restoring the status quo ante. 6 5
The purchaser of the property and the bank filed a demurrer
arguing that Shilling lacked standing to raise any claim against
the defendants because Shilling could not enforce the provisions
Ordiof the Loudoun County Land Subdivision and Development
66 The trial court sustained the demurrer. 16 7
nance.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 204 & n.*, 597 S.E.2d at 207 & n.*.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204-05, 597 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 205, 597 S.E.2d at 207-08.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205-06, 597 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 206, 597 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Shilling argued
that the local ordinance allowed private parties to enforce the ordinance.1 6 The court held that as a subdivision of the Commonwealth, the county could not create a private right of action absent enabling legislation from the General Assembly.16 9 Shilling
argued that two Virginia Code provisions, sections 15.2-2241 and
15.2-2255, allowed a private right of action.1 70 The court noted
that the language in those sections is very general, and held that
absent an express grant of authority from the General Assembly,
the locality could not create a right for a private party to bring
suit to enforce local ordinances. 17 ' Therefore,
Shilling did not have
17 2
standing to enforce the local ordinance.
VII. EXPERT TESTIMONY
Hinkley v. Koehler 171 involved the application of Virginia Code
section 8.01-581.20(A) which provides:
A witness shall be qualified to testify as an expert on the standard of
care if he demonstrates expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant's specialty and of what conduct conforms or fails to conform
to those standards and if he has had an active clinical practice in either the defendant's specialty or a related field of medicine within
one year of the
date of the alleged act or omission forming the basis
174
of the action.

In that case, a plaintiff, who was pregnant with twins, consulted
defendant obstetricians with complaints of decreased fetal activity. 7 5 Over a two-day period of testing and monitoring plaintiffs
condition, both of the fetuses died in utero.'7 6 At trial, one of defendants' experts was a professor at George Washington University Medical School. 77 Although he had practiced for thirty-three
years, the expert had given up "'hands-on delivering obstetrics"'

Id., 597 S.E.2d at 208-09.
169. Id. at 207-08, 597 S.E.2d at 209.
170. Id. at 207, 597 S.E.2d at 209.
171. See id. at 208, 597 S.E.2d at 209-10.
168.

172.

Id., 597 S.E.2d at 210.

173.

269 Va. 82, 606 S.E.2d 803 (2005).

174. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
175. Hinkley, 269 Va. at 86, 606 S.E.2d at 805.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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several years previously in favor of teaching and consulting, particularly related to "high-risk pregnancy cases and associated
problems.""'8
There was no issue with respect to the expert's knowledge and
expertise. The Supreme Court of Virginia made clear that the
statute imposed two tests, termed the "knowledge requirement"
and the "active clinical practice requirement," which must be independently satisfied.1 79 The court agreed with defendants that
with respect to the latter test, it was not necessary to show that
the expert had engaged in a specific medical procedure or the
physical process of delivering a baby within the preceding year. 8 0
Nonetheless, it held that the expert's teaching and consulting
failed to meet the "active clinical practice" requirement and that
the trial judge had abused his discretion in permitting the expert
to testify.' Accordingly, the jury's verdict in favor of defendants
was reversed."8 2
8 also involved disputed expert testimony.184
Vasquez v. Mabini"'
In this case, plaintiffs decedent was killed by a bus driven by de8 5 Prior to her death,
fendant while standing at an intersection."
the decedent was employed as a part time clerical worker, although she was searching for a full time position.' 86 She had an
adult son living at home who was bipolar and had emotional and
psychological problems, which rendered him dependent on the decedent.1 87 At trial, plaintiff introduced expert testimony from a finance professor at American University, who projected the decedent's lost income and the value of her lost household services.' 88
In so doing, he employed a number of assumptions including that
the decedent would have found full time employment and remained employed until retirement, that her employer would contribute to a 401k or similar retirement plan at the rate of 3.7 per-

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. at 88, 606 S.E.2d at 806.
See id. at 89, 606 S.E.2d at 807.
Id. at 90, 606 S.E.2d at 807.
Id. at 92, 606 S.E.2d at 808.
269 Va. 155, 606 S.E.2d 809 (2005).
Id. at 158, 606 S.E.2d at 810.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 159, 606 S.E.2d at 811.
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cent of her income, that her income would increase at the rate of
4.25 percent per year, and that her adult son would live twentyfour years into the future even though the witness knew the son
had died before trial.8 9 The jury returned a substantial verdict
for plaintiff.'90
Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 provides that expert witnesses
may testify "from facts, circumstances or data made known to or
perceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial."'9 1
Such evidence need not be independently admissible "if of a type
normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise."'9 2 Where such evidence is based entirely on statistics and
assumptions, it "is not merely subject to refutation by crossexamination or by counter-experts; it is inadmissible." 9 3 Stated
differently: "'In order to form a reliable basis for a calculation of
lost future income or loss of earning capacity, such evidence must
be grounded upon facts specific to the individual whose loss is be9 4 The Supreme
ing calculated.'"'
Court of Virginia examined each
of the key assumptions upon which the expert's opinion was
based and found each to be lacking in factual basis in the context
of this case. 9 ' There was also substantial discussion in the opinion as to whether defendant's objection had been waived under
the pre-trial scheduling order and whether a contemporaneous
objection had been noted at trial under Supreme Court of Virginia
Rule 5:25.196 The court held that plaintiffs pre-trial disclosure
was not sufficiently detailed to give defendant notice of the
grounds for objection and that defendant had noted timely and
repeated objections at trial.'9 7 Accordingly, the jury's verdict was

reversed. 198
In Christian v. Surgical Specialists of Richmond, Ltd., 99 the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a physician is qualified to

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 158, 606 S.E.2d at 810.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
Id.
Vasquez, 269 Va. at 160, 606 S.E.2d at 811.
Id. (quoting Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 233, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1990)).
Id. at 160-61, 606 S.E.2d at 811-12.
Id. at 161, 163, 606 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id. at 162-63, 606 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id. at 163, 606 S.E.2d at 813.
268 Va. 60, 596 S.E.2d 522 (2004).
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give expert testimony so long as the physician is familiar with the
standard of care in Virginia. °° In this case, the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant committed medical malpractice during a gynecological surgical procedure in 1994.201At trial, the plaintiff called
one doctor as an expert witness pursuant to Virginia Code section
8.01-581.2.202 The doctor testified that he was licensed to practice in California and New York and had maintained a clinical
practice in gynecological surgery prior to the alleged act of medical malpractice.20 3 Furthermore, the doctor testified that he had
performed hundreds of similar procedures as the one at issue in
the case.20 4
Defendants attacked the doctor's ability to testify, maintaining
that the doctor was not particularly aware of the standard of care
applicable to such procedures in Virginia. 2 5 The doctor testified
that he knew about the Virginia standard of care based on discussions with other surgeons in Virginia and his attendance at
seminars and meetings in Virginia. 206 Moreover, the doctor testified that the basic surgical principles did not differ greatly from
state to state, and that he had testified concerning basic gynecological surgical principles in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Alabama, and Puerto Rico.20 7
The trial court ruled that the doctor had not demonstrated that
he was familiar with the statewide standard of care in Virginia,
and therefore, was not qualified to testify. 208 The Supreme Court
of Virginia reversed, holding that while the determination of
whether a witness demonstrates expert knowledge is a question
largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, the court
would reverse a holding that a witness is not qualified to testify
as an expert when it appears clearly from the record that the
witness possesses sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience to
make him competent to testify on the subject matter.2 9 In the

200. Id. at 66, 596 S.E.2d
201. Id. at 62, 596 S.E.2d
202. Id.
203. Id. at 63, 596 S.E.2d
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 64, 596 S.E.2d
209. Id. at 65, 596 S.E.2d

at 525.
at 523.
at 523.

at 524.
at 524.
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case at bar, the doctor testified that he was familiar with the Virginia standard of care based on his attendance at seminars and
through discussions with colleagues, and had extensive expertise
in the subject matter at the heart of the case.21° Therefore, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and the case
was remanded.211
VIII. WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS

The Supreme Court of Virginia invoked a rule waiving evidentiary objections in the case Drinkard-Nuckols v. Andrews." 2
Plaintiffs decedent visited the emergency room complaining of

wrist pain.2 13 An x-ray indicated a broken wrist. 214 The emergency

room doctor referred the decedent to the orthopedic surgeon on
call who scheduled outpatient surgery for the next day.215 During
the course of the emergency room visit, a chest x-ray was taken,
which indicated a "significant" abnormality noted by the radiologist in the decedent's medical records. 26 The next day, the wrist
was successfully set but none of the doctors involved noted the
abnormality in the chest x-ray and it was never communicated to
the decedent. 2 7 A few months later, the decedent visited her family physician who ordered a chest x-ray that indicated a significantly enlarged tumor in her lung from which she died a short
time later.21 '
Over plaintiffs objection, the orthopedic surgeon introduced
evidence to the effect that he would not normally review the chest
x-ray in preparation for wrist surgery.219 Instead, he suggested
that it would be the responsibility of the anesthesiologist, who
was not a party to the case, to review the chest x-ray in order to
determine whether it was prudent to administer anesthesia and

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 66, 596 S.E.2d at 525.
Id.
269 Va. 93, 606 S.E.2d 813 (2005).
Id. at 95, 606 S.E.2d at 814.
Id.
Id., 606 S.E.2d at 814-15.
Id. at 95-96, 606 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 96, 606 S.E.2d at 815.
Id.
Id. at 97, 606 S.E.2d at 815.
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to report to him any abnormality. 22° The jury evidently agreed
and returned a defense verdict. 22 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia
agreed that evidence tending to show that a non-party was negligent where such negligence is not an intervening or superseding
cause is irrelevant and inadmissible.22 2 Plaintiff had called the
radiologist in her case in chief, who testified to his expectation
that his interpretation of the x-ray would have been reviewed by
the emergency room physician and communicated to plaintiffs
223
decedent.
Quoting Southern Railway Co. v. Blanford,224 the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated: "If a party objects to the introduction of
evidence which is admitted, and afterwards introduces the same
evidence himself, it is not ground for reversing the judgment, although the evidence itself was incompetent." 22 5 Importantly, the
above referenced rule is only applicable where the objecting party
has introduced the objectionable evidence in direct testimony. As
stated by the court, it has "never held that the mere crossexamination of a witness or the introduction of rebuttal evidence,
either or both, will constitute a waiver of an exception to testimony which has been duly taken." 22 6 Because the evidence
pointed to negligence of two different doctors, the court held the
import of the evidence the same. 227 Because the testimony of the
radiologist had been introduced by the plaintiff on direct, her objection was deemed waived and the jury's verdict was upheld.2 28
The Supreme Court of Virginia reached the opposite result in
Pettus v. Gottfried. 2 9 This case also involved a claim of medical
malpractice related to plaintiffs decedent's admission to an
emergency room. 230 The decedent, who was complaining of chest

220. Id. at 97-98, 606 S.E.2d at 816.
221. Id. at 97, 606 S.E.2d at 815-16.
222. Id. at 100-04, 606 S.E.2d at 817-19.
223. Id. at 99-100, 606 S.E.2d at 817.
224. 105 Va. 373, 54 S.E. 1 (1906).
225. Drinkard-Nuckols,269 Va. at 101, 606 S.E.2d at 817 (internal quotations omitted)
(quotingBlanford, 105 Va. at 387, 54 S.E. at 6).
226. Id. at 102, 606 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 80102, 121 S.E. 82, 86 (1924)).
227. Id. at 102-03, 606 S.E.2d at 818-19.
228. Id. at 104, 606 S.E.2d at 819.
229. 269 Va. 69, 606 S.E.2d 819 (2005).
230. Id. at 72, 606 S.E.2d at 821.
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pains, was tested and released." 1 He suffered a seizure and died a
few days later.23 2 At trial, both parties introduced deposition testimony of various treating physicians.2 33 The Supreme Court of
Virginia examined in detail three specific passages, which were
admitted over the plaintiffs objection, and determined that one
was admissible and the other two were not.234 As to the two passages which were ruled inadmissible, defendant argued that
plaintiff had waived any right to object by introducing similar
235
evidence herself.
Citing to its discussion of this evidentiary rule in DrinkardNuckols, the court reaffirmed as the general rule that when a
party unsuccessfully objects to evidence offered by the opposing
party but offers evidence "of the same character" on his own behalf, any right to object to the testimony is waived. 236 The court
noted that usually the waiver occurs by subsequent introduction
of similar evidence, but stated that the rule applies "regardless of
the order of introduction." 23' The testimony that plaintiff had introduced through the doctors' depositions, while arguably violating the evidentiary rule against speculation, did not relate to the
same subject as the testimony to which the plaintiff objected.2 38
The court refused to apply the waiver rule in this circumstance,
stating:
The defendants, however, effectively ask us to enlarge the rule's
scope to apply this waiver principle to any purported violation of the
same rule of evidence even when the subject matter of the testimony
or exhibit at issue is not the same. We decline the defendant's request because the rule properly focuses on a party's introduction of
evidence on the same subject and was never intended to create a
waiver permitting the consideration of inadmissible evidence on a
different subject. 9

231. Id., 606 S.E.2d at 822.
232. Id. at 73, 606 S.E.2d at 822.
233. Id. at 73-76, 606 S.E.2d at 822-24.
234. Id. at 73-74, 606 S.E.2d at 822-23. One passage was stricken on the basis that the
doctor was testifying to medical conclusions not held to a "reasonable degree of medical
probability" as required by Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B). Id. at 78, 606 S.E.2d at 825.
In the other passage, the doctor testified that he was "pretty sure" the nurses would have
informed him of any complaints of chest pain. Id. at 74, 606 S.E.2d at 823. This passage
was stricken as speculative and without factual basis. Id.
235. Id. at 75, 606 S.E.2d at 823.
236. Id. at 79, 606 S.E.2d at 825.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
239. 269 Va. at 79-80, 606 S.E.2d at 826.
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Accordingly, the court reversed the defense verdict and remanded
the case for a new trial.2 4 °
IX. VIRGINIA PROCUREMENT ACT

Mid-Atlantic Business Communications, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles 241 involved a claim under a contract to
create and install an Internet Call Center for the Department of
Motor Vehicles ("DMV").242 DMV rejected a portion of the work
citing "security issues."24 3 This resulted in a claim for the balance
of the contract amount. 244 DMV's Manager of Budget and Procurement responded by letter, dated August 22, 2002, stating
that Mid-Atlantic's claim for payment was denied.24 Mid-Atlantic
then lodged its claim with the Commissioner of DMV, who responded by letter dated August 30, 2002, to the effect that "the
DMV stands by the decision to cancel."2 46 Finally, Mid-Atlantic
sent a demand for payment to the Comptroller of the Commonwealth.2 47 By letter, dated January 31, 2003, the Comptroller denied Mid-Atlantic's claim.2 4 The suit was filed on February 27,
2003.249
Under the Virginia Public Procurement Act, 25 ° any suit on a
claim against a public body based on a contract awarded under
be filed within six months of "final decision of the
the act must 25
'public body."' ' DMV asserted that Mid-Atlantic's suit was time
barred. 25 2 Mid-Atlantic argued that the final decision did not occur until it received the January 31, 2003 letter from the Commissioner of DMV which would render its suit timely. 2 3 Among
other things, Mid-Atlantic cited to the claim procedure of Virginia
240.
241.

Id. at 81, 606 S.E.2d at 827.
269 Va. 51, 606 S.E.2d 835 (2005).

242. Id. at 54, 606 S.E.2d at 837.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at 54-55, 606 S.E.2d at 837.

245. Id. at 55, 606 S.E.2d at 837.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4301 to -4363 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
Mid-Atlantic, 269 Va. at 55-56, 606 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 55, 606 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 56-57, 606 S.E.2d at 838.
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Code section 2.2-814."4 This section specifically provides: "Any
person having any pecuniary claim against the Commonwealth
upon any legal ground shall present the same to the head of the
department... responsible for the alleged act or omission which,
if proved, gives rise to the claim.""
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the provisions of the
Virginia Public Procurement Act control claims arising under
contracts awarded pursuant to the act.256 The fact that MidAtlantic invoked what the court termed a "separate, unrelated
procedure" under Virginia Code section 2.2-814 did not affect the
court's analysis. 2 7 Accordingly, the court determined that the
August 22, 2002 letter from the Manager of Budget and Procurement constituted the final decision of the agency under the terms
of the Vendor's Manual applicable to the subject contract. 258 Because Mid-Atlantic did not file its suit until February 27, 2003,
the suit was untimely, and the trial court correctly sustained
DMV's statute of limitations plea.25 9
Finally, the court examined Mid-Atlantic's contention that the
statute of limitations was tolled under Virginia Code section 8.01229(D). 260 This statute tolls the statute of limitations if the defendant obstructs the filing of the suit by any "direct or indirect"
means.261 Mid-Atlantic contended that DMV's action forwarding a
recommendation to the Comptroller under the claims procedure
of Virginia Code section 2.2-814 led it to believe the prior decisions were not final and delayed the filing of suit.26 2 The court rejected DVV's claim that it was not subject to Virginia Code section 8.10-229(D), but found there to be no facts to support MidAtlantic's claim of obstruction.26 3

254. Id. at 56, 606 S.E.2d at 838.
255.

VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-814(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
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Mid-Atlantic, 269 Va. at 56, 606 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
Id. at 56-57, 606 S.E.2d at 838.
Id. at 57, 606 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 58, 606 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 58-59, 606 S.E.2d at 839.
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X. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The case of Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club26 4 involved
whether a trial court erred in declining to give an instruction on
negligence per se.26 Schlimmer, a fourteen year old, was a guest
of his father on a hunting expedition on property leased to the defendant hunt club.26 6 The members of the club assigned different
hunters to various hunting stands in the woods.267 Schlimmer and
his father were assigned to a particular hunting stand called
"Fletcher's Old Stand."268 "They were told that someone would
meet them.., and show them where their assigned stand was located."2 69 No one met them there.27 0
After some period of time, Schlimmer and his father decided
that they could find the stand themselves. 1 They found a stand
familiar to Schlimmer's father and sat down. 2 Meanwhile, another hunter, Cofield, walked past Schlimmer about twenty-five
to thirty yards away and proceeded to an adjacent stand.27 3 Neither Schlimmer nor his father said anything to Cofield, and
Cofield did not see either one of them.2 74 Schlimmer was then shot
by Cofield 5
A game warden investigated the accident and "charged Cofield
with reckless handling of a firearm in violation of [Virginia Code
section] 18.2-56.1(A)." 276 That section makes it "unlawful for any
person to handle recklessly any firearm so as to endanger the life,
limb or8 property of any person."27 7 Cofield pled guilty to this of27
fense.
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269.
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268 Va. 74, 597 S.E.2d 43 (2004).
See id. at 76, 597 S.E.2d at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77, 597 S.E.2d at 44.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
Schlimmer, 268 Va. at 77, 597 S.E.2d at 45.
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At the civil trial, Schlimmer moved for the Supreme Court of
Virginia to give the jury an instruction on negligence based on
Cofield's guilty plea." 9 The trial court refused, finding that
"[Cofield] could have been convicted of reckless handling of a firearm even if nobody had been hit."2 8 ° In reversing the trial court's
decision, the court held that "[a] litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his or her theory of the case if sufficient
evidence is introduced to support that theory."2"' Moreover, "'[i]f a
proffered instruction finds any support in credible evidence, its
refusal is reversible error."'28 2 For negligence, a party must present evidence that demonstrates: (1) that the opposing party violated a statute enacted for public safety, (2) that the party is part
of the class of persons for whom the statute is designed to protect,
and (3) that the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the
2 3
injury. 8
The first two prongs of the negligence per se standard are to be
determined as a matter of law by the trial court, while the issue
of proximate causation is to be decided by the jury.2 4 The court
held that Schlimmer had provided sufficient evidence that Cofield
violated a statute enacted for the public safety and that he was
28 5
part of the class of people the statute was designed to protect.
Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case.28 8
XI. COUNSEL OF RECORD

The question of whether an attorney who delivers a pleading,
signed by a pro se plaintiff, on behalf of that plaintiff, is "counsel
of record" was addressed in Walker v. American Ass'n of Professional Eye Care Specialists.8 7 Walker signed a motion for judg-

279.
280.
281.
282.
(1975)).
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 78, 597 S.E.2d at 45.
Id. (alteration in original).
See id.
Id. (quoting McClung v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 654, 657, 212 S.E.2d 290, 293
See id. at 78-79, 597 S.E.2d at 46.
Id. at 79, 597 S.E.2d at 46.
See id.
Id. at 80, 597 S.E.2d at 46.
268 Va. 117, 119, 597 S.E.2d 47, 47 (2004).
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ment alleging negligent medical treatment by the defendants.28 8
Attorney Robert S. Cohen arranged for delivery of the motion for
judgment to the trial court because Walker did not know the location of the courthouse.28 9 Cohen also drafted a cover letter indicating that the motion for judgment was to be filed on behalf of
Walker and included a check drawn on Cohen's client trust account for the filing fee.29 °
Cohen had represented Walker prior to initiation of the lawsuit
to investigate whether Walker had a case and established an escrow account for Walker.29 1 Cohen later informed Walker that he
would not represent her in the case, but agreed to help Walker
find an expert witness, used some of the money from the escrow
account for the filing fee, and forwarded the remainder to
Walker's new attorney.2 92 Both Cohen and Walker understood at
the time the motion for judgment was filed that Cohen was not
her attorney.2 9 3
Defendants "filed a motion to strike and a motion to quash, arguing that Walker's pleading was improperly signed because
Cohen represented her."29 4 The trial court granted the motions,
finding that Walker's pleading had been improperly signed by her
under Rules 1:4 and 1A:4 of the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 9 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding as
a matter of law that Cohen was not Walker's counsel of record.2 96
Because Cohen was not Walker's counsel as a matter of law,
Walker did not act improperly in signing her name on the pleading.297

XII.

NONSUITS

The issue of whether a plaintiff lacking standing who suffers a
nonsuit can preclude a nonsuit by a subsequent plaintiff with
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292.
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295.
296.
297.

Id., 597 S.E.2d at 47-48.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120, 597 S.E.2d at 48.
See id.
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standing was before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Brake v.
Payne.29 8 Guadalupe Sias, the parent and next of kin of Eduardo
Calzada, filed a motion for judgment (the "First Action") against
Kelly Harrison, a police officer, alleging assault and battery, and
false imprisonment, arising from Calzada's arrest.2 99 Calzada was
deceased at the time the First Action was filed.3 00 Harrison filed a
demurrer, asserting that Sias did not have standing to file suit in
Calzada's name.0 1 The circuit court agreed and sustained the
demurrer, but allowed Sias leave to amend the motion for judgment. °2 Sias, however, elected to suffer a voluntary nonsuit of the
action,3 and the circuit court entered an order nonsuiting the
case.

30

Subsequently, Kelly Payne, as personal representative of the
estate of Calzada, filed a motion for judgment (the "Second Action") in the same circuit court alleging the same claims as in the
First Action plus numerous other claims against Harrison and a
host of other law enforcement defendants. 0 4 Payne never served
any of the defendants. 0 5 On the day before the expiration of the
one-year service limitation, Payne submitted a proposed nonsuit
order to the circuit court.30 6 However, "she did not file a praecipe
30 7
or otherwise schedule a hearing for entry of the nonsuit order."
Six months later, Payne filed another motion for judgment (the
"Third Action"), alleging essentially the same claims against the
same defendants as in the Second Action. 0 8 Payne did effectuate
service of process on the defendants in the Third Action. 30 9 The
defendants in the Third Action objected to the nonsuit in the Second Action, arguing that it was not timely.310 The trial court concluded that the Second Action was distinct from the First Action,
thus the request of a nonsuit in the Second Action was the first
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268 Va. 92, 95, 597 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2004).
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 60-61.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 61.
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Id.
Id. at 95-96, 597 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 96, 597 S.E.2d at 61.
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request for a nonsuit, and determined that the order of nonsuit in
the Second Action be entered nunc pro tunc to the date when the
order was originally submitted.3 1 '
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the two main issues addressed were (1) whether the circuit court erred in allowing a nonsuit in the Second Action, and (2) whether the circuit
court erred by entering the nonsuit order nunc pro tunc to the
date it was filed.312
The court held that the circuit court did not err in allowing a
nonsuit in the Second Action. 3 The court held that because Sias
did not have standing in the First Action, and because Sias and
Payne were not "substantially the same parties" (they were not
suing in the same right), a nonsuit in the Second Action was the
first nonsuit, and thus allowable. 4
The court, however, reversed the circuit court's entry of the
nonsuit order nunc pro tunc. 31 5' The court noted that "the purpose
of a nunc pro tunc entry is to correct mistakes of the clerk or
other court officials . . .to make the record show what actually
took place."" 6 In contrast, a nunc pro tunc order cannot be used to
make the record say something that did not take place or what
ought to have taken place. 1 7 Therefore, the court held that the
circuit court erred in backdating the entry of the nonsuit order
within the one-year service limitation, and thus the case was remanded.3 18
XIII. ASSAULT AND WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT
In Etherton v. Doe,31 9 the issue before the Supreme Court of
Virginia was "the sufficiency of evidence to frame a jury issue
with respect to assault and willful and wanton conduct in a non-
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313.
314.

Id. at 97, 597 S.E.2d at 61-62.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 62.
See id. at 100, 597 S.E.2d at 63.
Id.

315. See id. at 101, 597 S.E.2d at 64.
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Id. at 100, 597 S.E.2d at 64 (quoting Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 293,

94 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1956)).
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Id. at 101, 597 S.E.2d at 64.
Id.
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contact automobile tort case."32° The facts at trial demonstrated
that a motorist continually and aggressively bumped, harassed,
and veered across lanes toward Etherton while driving adjacent
to her.3 2 ' Finally, Etherton was forced to slam on her brakes,
causing Etherton's car to slam into a curb.3 22 As a result of the
crash, Etherton suffered
an infection in her abdominal wall re2
quiring surgery.1 1
Etherton filed a motion for judgment against John Doe, as the
driver was never identified, on three counts: negligence, assault,
and willful and wanton conduct justifying punitive damages.3 2 4 At
trial, the circuit court sustained defense motions to strike plaintiffs evidence with regard to assault and willful and wanton conduct. 325 Etherton appealed the circuit court's actions striking the
evidence with regard to those two claims.32 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that a court can only grant
a motion to strike the plaintiffs evidence "when it plainly appears
that the court would be compelled to set aside any verdict ... as
being without evidence to support it."3 27 Citing Koffman v. Garnett,328 the court stated that to establish assault, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant performed an act intended to
cause either harmful or offensive contact or apprehension of immediate battery.3 29 There is no requirement that the victim be
physically touched. 33' The court held that the evidence at trial
was sufficient to warrant the inference that Doe's actions intended to cause harmful contact or apprehension of such contact,
and created in Etherton's mind a reasonable apprehension of imminent battery.33 1
With regard to the willful and wanton conduct, the court also
held that Etherton had provided sufficient evidence for a jury to
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327.
328.
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Id. at 211, 597 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 211-12, 597 S.E.2d at 88-89.
Id. at 212, 597 S.E.2d at 89.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
265 Va. 12, 574 S.E.2d 258 (2003).
Etherton, 268 Va. at 213, 597 S.E.2d at 89.
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find that Doe acted willfully and wantonly." 2 Quoting Booth v.
Robertson,33 a the court held that punitive damages are available
for "'negligence which is so willful or wanton as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others.'

334

Actions are willful and

wanton if the defendant is conscious of his actions, is aware of the
dangers or probable consequences of proceeding with the action,
and decides to proceed notwithstanding that awareness.335 The
court held that the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for a jury
to find that Doe acted willfully and wantonly. 336 Therefore, the
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court.

3 37

XIV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

In Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould Co., 331 Joyce Green and
John Gural's home was destroyed by fire. 339 They then hired the
defendant, Goodman-Gable-Gould ("GGG"), to help them process
a fire loss claim with their insurer. 3" Green and Gural signed a
contract with GGG, agreeing to pay GGG ten percent of the
amount adjusted or recovered.34 '
After a period of time, the plaintiffs became dissatisfied with
GGG's performance and requested that GGG withdraw from adjustment of the fire loss claim.342 GGG disagreed, and demanded
that it be paid on any amount recovered from the insurance company. 343 GGG then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment
that GGG had an interest in the insurance proceeds and that
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334.
S.E.2d
335.
S.E.2d
336.
337.
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339.
340.
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Id., 597 S.E.2d at 89-90.
236 Va. 269, 374 S.E.2d 1 (1988).
Etherton, 268 Va. at 213, 597 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Robertson, 236 Va. at 273, 374
at 3).
Id. at 213-14, 597 S.E.2d at 90; see also Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315
210, 213 (1984).
268 Va. at 214, 597 S.E.2d at 90.
Id.
268 Va. 102, 597 S.E.2d 77 (2004).
Id. at 104, 597 S.E.2d at 78.
Id.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 78-79.
Id. at 105, 597 S.E.2d at 79.
Id.
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GGG was owed a fee of ten percent on any money recovered.3 44
GGG also claimed breach of contract and quantum meruit, but
nonsuited those claims prior to trial.3 45 Green and Gural filed a
summary judgment motion on the only remaining claim for a declaratory judgment, but that was overruled by the trial court.34 6
On appeal, "[tihe sole issue [was] whether the circuit court
abused its discretion in allowing this case to proceed as a declaratory judgment action after GGG nonsuited its other claims."3 47
34
Citing primarily USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Randolph
and Williams v. Southern Bank of Norfolk,34 9 the Supreme Court
of Virginia distinguished between an appropriate use of declaratory judgments to determine the rights of parties versus the inappropriate use of declaratory judgments versus final adjudication of the merits of future litigation. Upon the facts of the case
at bar, the court determined that GGG's declaratory judgment
proceeding was really a determination of a disputed issuewhether the contract was violated-rather than an adjudication
of rights. 351 Therefore, the court held that the circuit court inappropriately allowed the declaratory judgment action to continue.3 5 2
XV. CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc., dealt with whether the
plaintiffs claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence against a charity are barred by the doctrine of charitable
immunity.3 54 Cowan's mother was placed in the defendant's care
for a period of time.355 While defendant's employees were moving
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352.
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Id.
Id. at 106, 597 S.E.2d at 79.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 80.
255 Va. 342, 497 S.E.2d 744 (1998).
203 Va. 657, 125 S.E.2d 803 (1962).
Green, 268 Va. at 107-08, 597 S.E.2d at 80.
Id. at 108, 597 S.E.2d at 80-81.
Id. at 110, 597 S.E.2d at 82.
268 Va. 482, 603 S.E.2d 916 (2004).
Id. at 484, 603 S.E.2d at 917.
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Cowan's mother, her leg became caught in the bed." 6 The defendant only provided painkillers and did not provide any other
medical treatment.5 7
A week later, Cowan visited her mother and found that her leg
was severely swollen.358 Cowan took her mother to a nearby hospital, where she was diagnosed with a shattered femur, requiring
amputation of the leg. 359 During surgery, the mother died from

complications.360
Cowan filed a motion for judgment against the Hospice for
wrongful death of her mother based on claims of negligence, gross
negligence, willful and wanton negligence, and negligent hiring
and retention. 361' The simple negligence count was dismissed upon
consent of both parties. 362 The Hospice then filed a plea in bar of
charitable immunity to the counts of gross negligence and willful
and wanton negligence, and demurrer to the negligent hiring and
retention claims.363 The circuit court sustained the plea in bar
and the demurrers."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that charitable
institutions are only immune from liability to its beneficiaries for
acts of simple negligence.365 The court differentiated between
simple negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton negligence.366 While simple negligence usually arises from the routine
performance of a charity's activities, gross and willful and wanton
negligence do not. 67 Public policy immunizes charities from
claims for simple negligence to allow charities to perform public
functions. 36" This public policy is inapplicable where the conduct
is gross negligence or willful and wanton negligence, because it is
not an attempt to carry out the mission of the charity to serve its
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beneficiaries. 69 Therefore, the court held that the charitable immunity doctrine only shields charities from claims for simple negligence. °
XVI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Lee v. Mulford,371 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the procedure necessary to recover attorney's fees. 372 Lee sued
Mulford on a promissory note, seeking damages plus attorney's
fees.37 3 During the resulting trial, Lee offered no evidence of attorney's fees.374 The promissory note did state that upon default
on the note, the non-defaulting party would be entitled to attorney's fees.375 Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict providing
that each party split attorney's fees.376 Following trial, the trial
court held a hearing to determine attorney's fees.377 Following
written and oral arguments, the trial court entered a final order
denying attorney's fees.378
On appeal, Lee argued that the trial court erred by failing to
award his attorney's fees in light of the unambiguous contract
language mandating the award of such fees. 37 9 Lee's assignment
of error was predicated on the "assertion that 'it is customary to
argue the issue of fees post-trial.' 38 0

The Supreme Court of Virginia was not persuaded. Quoting
Mullins v. Richlands National Bank,38 1 the court held that where
a promissory note provides for attorney's fees but does not specify
an amount, "'a fact finder is required to determine from the evidence what are reasonable fees under the facts and circumstances

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id.
Id.
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of the particular case.' ' 82 Therefore, absent evidence at trial concerning attorney's fees, the jury could not award attorney's fees.3 83
Parties are allowed with the concurrence of the trial court, to bifurcate the case to allow for a separate fact-finding hearing on attorney's fees after trial.3" As the court stated, however, "[a]bsent
agreement . . . or pursuant to contract or statute with specific
provisions [concerning bifurcation], a litigant is not entitled to bifurcate the issues and have the matter of attorney's fees decided
by the trial court in post-verdict proceedings."3 85
XVII.

SUPREME COURT RULE AMENDMENTS

On September 30, 2004, the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered
a number of amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court,
most of which took effect on January 1, 2005.386 Among these was
an amendment to Rule 4:9(b) adding the following language:
When one party to a civil proceeding subpoenas documents concerning another party, the subpoenaing party, upon receipt of the subpoenaed documents, shall, if requested, provide true and full copies
of the same to any party or to the attorney for any other party in accordance with Code § 8.01-417(B).387

For many years, all subpoenas were issued by the clerk and returnable to the clerk's office.3 88 Subpoenaed documents could be
reviewed by any party in the clerk's office or checked out, usually
overnight, for copying.3 89 In order to relieve the clerks from becoming depositories for discovery material, the Supreme Court of
Virginia amended Rule 4:9 to permit the attorney requesting issuance of the subpoena to designate the place where the subpoena would be returnable.3 9 ° Usually, the place designated

382. Lee, 269 Va. at 565, 611 S.E.2d at 350-51.
383. See id. at 565-66, 611 S.E.2d at 351.
384. Id., 611 S.E.2d at 351-52.
385. Id. at 567-68, 611 S.E.2d at 352.
386. See Virginia's Judicial System, Supreme Court of Virginia, Amendments to the
Rules of Court, at http://www.courts.state.va.us/amend.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
387. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:9(b) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. At the time of this amendment, all subpoenas were still issued by the clerk.
Virginia Code section 8.01-407 now permits attorneys to issue most subpoenas. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-407 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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would be the offices of the attorney requesting issuance of the
subpoena. This practice gave rise to some debate as to whether
other parties would continue to have access to the subpoenaed
documents. The General Assembly foreclosed any debate on this
issue in 2004 by adding an express requirement to this effect in
Virginia Code section 8.01-417(B).39 1 This amendment conforms
Rule 4:9 to the new statutory language. 9 2
Other September 30, 2004 rule changes included amendments
to Rules 5:20, regarding denial of appeal and petition for rehearing; 93 5:39, regarding rehearing; 94 5A:15, regarding denial of appeal and petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals of Virginia;3 95 5A:33, regarding rehearing on motion of a party;39 6 and
5A:34, regarding rehearing en banc.39 7 The rule changes added
new Rules 5:20A, regarding petition for rehearing filed as a PDF
document;39' 5:39A, regarding notice of intent to apply for a rehearing filed as a PDF document; 399 5A:15A, regarding denial of a
petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals of Virginia; 4° 5A:33A,
regarding rehearing on motion of a party in the Court of Appeals
of Virginia;40 ' and 5A:34A, regarding rehearing en banc in the
Court of Appeals of Virginia. °2 These changes generally follow
the amendment to Rule 5:20 relating to petitions for rehearing
following denial of a petition for appeal by the Supreme Court of
Virginia.0 3 Previously, this rule provided that following denial of
a petition for appeal, the petitioner could move for a rehearing.4 4
The petition was to be in traditional hard copy form "not [to] exceed 15 typed or printed pages in length."40 5 Rule 5:20 has been

391. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-417(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
392. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4.9(b) (Repl. Vol. 2005). The General Assembly enacted additional amendments to Virginia Code § 8.01-417(B) in 2005 which are discussed in the legislative portion of this article. See infra notes 497-99 and accompanying text.
393. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
394. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:39 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
395. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:15 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
396. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:33 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
397. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:34 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
398. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
399. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:39A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
400. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:15A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
401. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:33A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
402. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:34A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
403. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
404. Id.
405. Id.
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rewritten to require all petitions for rehearing, except those filed
by pro se prisoners or by leave of court, to be filed electronically
attached to an e-mail as further specified in
as a PDF document
40 6
5:20A.
Rule
new
Rule 5:20A contains the technical requirements of the new
electronic petitions for rehearing.4 °7 Documents are to be formatted to print out on 8 1/2 x 11-inch pages, double-spaced, with
twelve-point type or larger and with a word count not exceeding
7500 words.4"' The petition must contain a certificate of service
and a certificate of compliance with the word-count limit.40 9 The
petition must be attached to an e-mail sent to scvpfr@courts.
state.va.us and reciting in the subject line the style of the case
and the court record number. 410 The body of the message should
contain a statement that a petition for rehearing is attached,
identify counsel filing the petition and include an e-mail address
for opposing counsel if the petition is being served electronically.4 1 ' The petition for rehearing is considered timely filed if received by the clerk's office by 11:59 p.m. on the due date.4 1 2 Upon
receipt, the clerk will send an acknowledgement by return email.4 13
Comparable amendments were made to Rule 5:39 relating to
rehearings following decisions of the full Supreme Court of Virginia, 41 4' Rule 5A:15 relating to appeals of criminal and traffic
cases to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 41 5 Rule 5A:33 relating to
and Rule
civil appeals to the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
5A:34 relating to rehearings en banc by the Court of Appeals of
Virginia. 417 New Rules 5:39A, 5A:15A, 5A:33A, and 5A:34A were
added with technical requirements generally per the above discussion. 418 Counsel filing a petition for rehearing in any of these
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cases should obviously review these new rules carefully. All are
set to expire on December 31, 2005 unless extended by further
order of the Supreme Court of Virginia.41 9
On December 22, 2004, the Supreme Court of Virginia
amended a number of additional rules. 42 0 Most of these amendments took effect on April 1, 2005.421 One amendment, which took
effect immediately, related to appeals under the Administrative
Process Act ("APA"). 42 2 Rule 2A:1 authorizing such appeals 423 and
Rule 2A:2 relating to notices of appeal4 2 4 were amended to refer to
the correct Virginia Code sections following recodification of the
APA from Title 9 to Title 2.2. Prior references to Virginia Code
section 9-6.14:14 are now to Virginia Code section 2.2-4023 and
references to Virginia Code section 9-6.14:16 are now to Virginia
Code section 2.2-4026.425 It does not appear that any substantive
changes were intended.
A new Rule 1:1A was added addressing recovery of attorney's
fees and costs incurred on appeal.4 26 It provides that notwithstanding Rule 1:1, any "appellee who has recovered attorneys'
fees, costs or both in the circuit court pursuant to a contract,
statute or other applicable law may" seek an assessment of additional fees or costs incurred on appeal. 42' This procedure may be
invoked by filing in the circuit court an application within thirty
days after denial of a petition for appeal or petition for rehearing. 428 The rule provides that the prior action be reinstated on the
docket, that no new action seeking recovery of fees and costs need
be filed and that the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction over
the case for purposes of adjudicating the application. 429 Rule 5:20
was amended to refer to this new procedure.430

419. See supra notes 406-17.
420. See Virginia Judicial System, Supreme Court of Virginia, Amendments to the
Rules of Court, at http://www.courts.state.va.us/amend.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
421. Id.
422. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4000 to -4033 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
423. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2A:1 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
424. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2A:2 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
425. See supra notes 423-24.
426. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1A (Repl. Vol. 2005).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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Rules 2:16"3' and 3:15,432 both relating to the substitution of
parties, were amended with the addition of language specifically
requiring a copy of any proposed amended pleading substituting
parties to be served along with the motion for substitution on the
party being substituted and requiring the party being substituted
to file a responsive pleading within twenty-one days of service of
the motion and proposed amended pleading.4 33 Previously, the
rule required service of the motion only and did not specify any
requirements regarding a response to the motion.4 34
Finally, Rule 5A:4 regarding the form of briefs filed with the
Courts of Appeals of Virginia, formerly permitted briefs in elevenpoint type.435 That rule has now been amended to require a minimum of twelve-point type.43 6 Other provisions relating to the form
of briefs were unchanged.
XVIII. RECENT LEGISLATION
Easily the most significant legislation relating to civil litigation
in many years is Chapter 681 of the 2005 Acts of Assembly, which
has the effect of unifying law and equity procedure. 7 This necessitated amendments to forty-seven statutes and the repeal of two
statutes.4 38 No longer does the Virginia Code refer to suits in equity or the chancery side of the court.4 39 Motions for judgment and
bills of complaint will be replaced by a single form of action referred to as a complaint." ° A comprehensive revision to the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia will obviously follow to complete
this process.
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VA. SuP. CT. R. 2:16 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:15 (Repl. Vol. 2005).

433. See supra notes 431-32.
434. See supra notes 431-32.
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VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:4 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 681, 2005 Va. Acts 957 (codified as amended at VA. CODE

ANN. §§ 1-13.23:1 (Repl. Vol. 2005), 3.1-358, -389, 8.01-2, -23, -33, -272, -282 to -283, 331,-336,-426,-670, 9.1-406, 15.2-4119, 16.1-296, 17.1-124,-131,-213,-240,-249,-275,278 to -279, -513, -520, 18.2-500, -507, 19.2-385, -386.13, 20-96, 26-21, -29, 31-8.1, 40.149.4, 43-62 (Cum. Supp. 2005), 51.5-46, 53.1-70 (Repl. Vol. 2005), 55-19, -277, 56-521 to 522, 57-9, -16, 58.1-1727, 64.1-106, -179 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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Subsections B and C of Virginia Code section 2.2-2639 create a
statutory cause of action in favor of any employee of a firm or
business employing more than five but less than fifteen employees who is discharged "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions," or age if the employee is forty years old or older."
Formerly, the statute of limitations on bringing such a claim was
180 days from the date of discharge." 2 The statute of limitations
has been increased to 300 days. 43 If the employee has filed a complaint with the Human Rights Council or a local human rights or
human relations agency or commission within 180 days of the
discharge, then the action must be brought
within ninety days of
4
the final disposition of the complaint."
The judgment rate of interest provided by Virginia Code section 6.1-330.54 has been clarified to state that the rate applicable
to the judgment at the time of entry shall continue to apply until
the judgment is paid or otherwise satisfied and shall not be affected by subsequent amendments to the judgment rate."5 Currently, the judgment rate of interest is six percent. 4 6
A new Virginia Code section 8.01-4.3 provides that in a judicial
proceeding or administrative hearing any matter requiring a
sworn written declaration, verification, certificate, statement,
oath, or affidavit may be evidenced "with like force and effect" by
an unsworn written declaration which is subscribed to by the
maker under penalty of perjury. 447 The statute does not apply to
depositions, an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public.' 3 Virginia
Code section 18.2-434, the criminal statute regarding perjury,
was amended to include unsworn declarations pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-4.3. 449
Virginia Code section 8.01-15.2 provides that default judgment
shall not be entered unless the plaintiff files an affidavit stating
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2.2-2639 (Repl. Vol. 2005).

§ 6.1-330.54 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
§ 8.01-4.3 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
§ 18.2-434 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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whether or not the defendant is in military service or that "plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service.""' The General Assembly recently amended the
statute to provide that "[fiailure to file an affidavit shall not constitute grounds to set aside an otherwise valid default judgment
service of process
against a defendant who was not, at the time of451
or entry of default judgment, a servicemember."
Likewise, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-428 dealing with setting aside default judgments to
state affirmatively that proof that the defendant was entitled to
relief under the Act is grounds for setting aside a default judgment.4 52 Conversely, that section now states that "[niothing in
this section shall constitute grounds to set aside an otherwise
valid default judgment against a defendant who was not, at the
service of process or entry of judgment, a servicememtime of
, 453
ber.
Virginia Code section 8.01-251 governs enforcement of circuit
court judgments. 4 The section previously provided that no execution shall be issued on a judgment after twenty years "from the
date of such judgment."45 5 It now expressly contemplates judgments rendered by another state or country and provides that in
such case the twenty years shall run from "domestication of such
judgment." 4 6 The limitation on enforcement of judgments of the
general district courts is generally governed by Virginia Code section 16.1-94.1; however, upon docketing of the judgment in the
court, Virginia Code section 8.01-251 becomes applicacircuit
45 7
ble.
A plaintiff in a circuit court action may now request the defendant to waive service. 58 The request is required to allow the defendant a reasonable time in which to respond.4 59 If the defendant

450. Id. § 8.01-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
451. Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 909, 2005 Va. Acts 1603 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
452. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
453. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
454. Id. § 8.01-251 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
455. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2000).
456. Id. § 8.01-251 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
457. Id.
458. Id. § 8.01-286.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
459. Id. § 8.01-286.1(B)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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declines to accept service, the plaintiff may serve the defendant
through other means, and the Supreme Court of Virginia shall
award the plaintiff its costs in doing so, unless defendant can
show good cause for failing to waive service. 46" The plaintiff is also
entitled to attorneys' fees incurred in collecting these costs. 46' A
defendant who waives service as provided is allowed sixty days
from the date of request (ninety days for out of state defendants)
to file its grounds of defense or other initial responsive pleading. 462 Waiver of service does not waive any defenses going to
venue or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 463 The basic procedure will appear as Virginia Code section 8.01-286.1;
however, a number of other statutes are affected by this
change. 4
A new Virginia Code section 8.01-379.3 authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia in complex cases to propound interrogatories to the jury as to the basis of its verdict.46 5 Previously, the
authority of the Supreme Court of Virginia to ask the jury to render anything other than a general verdict was in doubt. Where
the jury's interrogatory answers are in conflict with its verdict,
the Supreme Court of Virginia may refer the case back to the jury
for further deliberations or grant a new trial. 46 6 This procedure is
not available in personal injury or wrongful death cases.46 7
Pre-existing Virginia Code section 8.01-398 prohibited testimony of private communications between husband and wife abThe only exception
sent affirmative consent of the other spouse. 468 Teol
was "where the law of this Commonwealth confers upon a spouse
a right of action against the other spouse." 469 Thus, such testimony was rendered incompetent where the other spouse was unable due to death or disability to consent even if the testimony
was favorable.47 ° On the other hand, its prohibition extended only

460. Id. § 8.01-286.1(B)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
461. Id. § 8.01-286.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
462. Id. § 8.01-286.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
463. Id. § 8.01-286.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
464. Id. § 8.01-286.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005) (affecting services provisions in Virginia Code
sections 8.01-296, -299, -301 to -306, and -320).
465. Id. § 8.01-379.3 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. § 8.01-398 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
469. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2000).
470. See id.
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to the husband and wife and would not, for example, prevent disclosure by a third party who overheard their conversation.4 7 ' Finally, and most importantly, it related only to testimony and did
not prevent introduction of written confidential communications
between husband and wife. 7 2 These and other issues were addressed by the General Assembly in the amendment as follows:
"In any civil proceeding, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent anyone else from disclosing, any confidential
communication between his spouse and him during their marriage."4 73 The foregoing privilege is not capable of assertion "in
any proceeding in which the spouses are adverse parties, or in
which either spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the
person or property of the other or against the minor child of either spouse."4 74
The General Assembly also adopted significant new procedures
regarding medical malpractice actions.4 75 These acts amended
Virginia Code sections 8.01-399 and 8.01-581.1 and added new
Virginia Code sections 8.01-20.1, 8.01-50.1, 8.01-52.1, 8.01581.20:1, 16.1-83.1, 38.2-2228.2 and 54.1-2912.3.476 All of the
foregoing center around two fundamental changes. As exemplified by the new Virginia Code section 8.01-20.1, the service of a
motion for judgment alleging medical malpractice is deemed to be
a certification that the plaintiff has obtained from an expert witness whom the plaintiff reasonably believes would qualify as an
expert witness, a written opinion signed by the expert that,
"based upon a reasonable understanding of the facts, the defendant... [has] deviated from the applicable standard of care and
477
the deviation was a proximate cause of the injuries claimed.
The "certification is not necessary if the plaintiff, in good faith,
alleges . . . a theory of liability where expert testimony is unnecessary because the alleged act of negligence clearly lies within the

471. See id.
472. See id.
473. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 809, 2005 Va. Acts 1342 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
474. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
475. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 649, 2005 Va. Acts 905 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-399, -581.1, -20.1, -50.1, -52.1, -581.20:1, 16.1-831, 38.2-2228.2 (Cum. Supp.
2005), 54.1-2912.3 (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
476. Id.
477. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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range of the jury's common knowledge and experience."4 7 The
certifying expert is not required to be an expert witness at trial,
and the defendant is not entitled to discover the identity of the
certifying expert or the nature of the certifying expert's opinions.47 9 If the certifying expert is identified as an expert expected
to testify at trial, then the expert's opinions are discoverable as
provided in Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 4:1 with the exception of the expert's status as a certifying expert.4 8 °
Upon written request of the defendant, the plaintiff is required
within ten days to provide written affirmation that plaintiff had
obtained the necessary certification prior to requesting service or
that plaintiff did not need to obtain a certifying opinion. 481 Failure
to comply with this section is grounds for imposition of sanctions
under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1, and, more importantly,
the court is empowered to "dismiss the case with prejudice."4 82
Comparable provisions were made with respect to wrongful death
484
actions 4 3 and malpractice cases in the general district courts.
The second major change relates to expressions of sympathy by
health care providers. New Virginia Code section 8.01-581.20:1
provides that "statements, writings, affirmations, benevolent
conduct, or benevolent gestures" which constitute an expression
of sympathy or "general sense of benevolence" made by a health
care provider or agent of a health care provider to a patient, relative of a patient, or representative of a patient "shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an
admission against interest" in any action arising out of an "unanticipated outcome of health care."485 Significantly, "[a] statement
of fault that is part of or in addition to any of the above shall not
be made inadmissible by this section."4 86 Similar provisions were
added with respect to wrongful death actions by new Virginia
Code section 8.01-52.1.487
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§ 8.01-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
§ 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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There was also a revision to Virginia Code section 8.01-399 regarding information subject to discovery. Formerly, the statute
provided that the "diagnosis or treatment plan" documented in
the medical record was subject to discovery.488 This language has
been expanded to include "diagnoses, signs and symptoms, observations, evaluations, histories, or treatment plan."" 9 Such information must be "contemporaneously documented during the
course of the practitioner's treatment."49 °
The General Assembly added new Virginia Code section 8.01413.02 dealing with admissibility of blood alcohol tests in civil
cases. 49 1 Previously, Virginia Code section 19.2-187.02 permitted
introduction of such records under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule in certain criminal cases involving intoxication.49 2 That rule has now been extended to "any civil proceeding."493 Moreover, Virginia Code section 19.2-187.02 had referenced "written results" of blood alcohol tests. 494 Both statutes now
provide that written "reports or records" of such tests may be admitted.4 95 Both statutes also contain a provision providing that
the patient's consent or authorization is not required and exempting such disclosure from all laws relating to confidentiality of patient records.4 96
Virginia Code section 8.01-417 has long provided that an injured party can obtain a copy of his own witness statement provided to any other party. 7 In 2004, the statute was amended to
add subsection B relating to documents obtained by subpoena
duces tecum.4 98 The General Assembly amended the statute by
inserting "[u]nless otherwise ordered for good cause shown" and

488. Id. § 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
489. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2005).
490. Id.
491. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 801, 2005 Va. Acts 1337 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-413.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
492. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.02 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
493. Id. § 8.01-413.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
494. Id. § 19.2-187.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
495. Id. §§ 8.01-413.02, 19.2-187.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
496. Id.
497. Id. § 8.01-417 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
498. Id.
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by deleting the description of the documents subject to the statute
as "concerning another party."49 9
Virginia Code section 8.01-506 relates to conducting interrogatories of a debtor to ascertain his estate subject to execution in
satisfaction of a judgment. °° A new Virginia Code section 8.01506.2 has been added permitting a debtor's interrogatories to be
conducted in a county or city where the debtor resides or in any
county or city contiguous thereto.50 ' In order to invoke this procedure, the judgment creditor is required to file in the court in
which the debtor's interrogatories will be conducted an abstract of
the judgment and pay any fees required under Virginia Code section 16.1-69.48:2 or 17.1-275.502 The court is then empowered to
issue a summons for the debtor's interrogatories and any subsequent executions on the judgment.0 3 The creditor must file any
releases or certificates of satisfaction with both courts.0 4
Virginia Code section 8.01-607 now provides that commissioners may be appointed by agreement of the parties, motion of either party or on the court's own motion, but in any event with a
finding of good cause made in the individual case. 5 5 This statute
overturns prevalent local practices of automatically referring certain types of cases, e.g., equitable distribution, to Commissioners
in Chancery.50 6
Virginia Code section 16.1-69.55 deals with retention of records
and enforcement of judgments of the general district courts.50 7
The general rule as specified in subsection (B)(2) is that general
district court judgments are valid and enforceable for ten years. 0 8
Subsection (B)(4) was substantially rewritten by the General Assembly.50 9 The statute previously provided that a judgment creditor may docket a general district court judgment on the judgment
499. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 211, 2005 Va. Acts 304 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-417(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
500.
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VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-506 (Cum. Supp. 2005).

Id. § 8.01-506.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 8.01-607 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id. § 16.1-69.55 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
Id.
Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 135, 2005 Va. Acts 231 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
16.1-69.55(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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lien docket of the circuit court.5 1 ° The statute was unclear as to
when and for how long the executions would continue to issue
from the general district court after the judgment had been docketed with the circuit court. Executions may now continue to be issued by the general district court for the remaining time permitted by Virginia Code section 16.1-94.1 without limitation and
thereafter by filing with the general district court an abstract of
the judgment from the circuit court.5 1 ' In all other respects, the
docketing of a general district court judgment with the circuit
court confers upon the judgment the same status as a circuit
court judgment.5 12
Virginia Code section 16.1-88.03 regulates the filing of pleadings and other papers by pro se parties. 13 The General Assembly
added subsection D, which requires a pro se party to promptly inform the court where the litigation is pending of any change of
address and to provide that, in the absence of such notification,
mailing to, or service at, the most recent address contained in the
court file shall be deemed effective. 14
The General Assembly also enacted certain modifications to
eminent domain procedures under Title 25.1 of the Virginia Code.
Most significantly, where a landowner is awarded thirty percent
over the condemnor's pre-condemnation offer, in addition to just
compensation for the take and damages, if any, to the residue, the
landowner is entitled to recovery of fees and costs of expert appraisers and engineers in the case. 515 A provision for recovery of
attorneys' fees where the condemnor has made a grossly inadequate pre-condemnation offer was defeated.
Virginia Code section 34-29 sets forth limitations on the maxi5 16
mum portion of disposable earnings subject to garnishment.
Previously, the limitation was the lesser of twenty-five percent of
disposable earnings or the amount in excess of thirty times the

510.

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.55(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2003).

511. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2005).
512. Id.
513. Id. § 16.1-88.03 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
514. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 136, 2005 Va. Acts 232 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-88.03(D) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-203(E), -245(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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federal minimum wage. 17 The latter limitation has now been increased to forty times the federal minimum wage.5 18
Finally, the General Assembly modified the procedural deadlines applicable to actions before the Workers Compensation
519
Commission under the Birth Injury Compensation Program.
Previously, the program filed its response within thirty days of
service."' Now it is not required to respond until ten days after
submission of the three-physician panel report with the Commission.52 After the program files its response, the hearing date is
set, no sooner than fifteen days, nor more than ninety days after
the filing of the Program's response.5 22 Previously, these deadlines
were keyed to the filing date of the petition and were forty-five
and 120 days, respectively.5 2 3

517. Id.
518. Id. § 34-29(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
519. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, chs. 50, 52, 2005 Va. Acts 124, 125 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5004, -5006 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
520. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5004(D) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
521. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2005).
522. Id. § 38.2-5006 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
523. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2002).

